Infrmation warfare limited to CNO and EW misses out on all the aspects where information isn’t stored on machines.
A few months back, as part of my post-grad studies, I had to look into the viability of electronic warfare on a global scale. This is part one of many posts that will revisit that work and expand on it where applicable and reduce parts of it where. Abstract Information warfare is currently fought on two planes: first is the legal and diplomatic plane where Russia and China on one side, and United States and the Western world on the other are trying to pass globally acceptable resolutions on cyber arms control and the definition of, and use of information warfare.
Associated Press runs the story on the fresh information about US cyber-warfare strategy. For example there’s the legalised continuation of espionage of friends and enemies alike by the US. Whilst most other countries have the decency to at least vehemently deny any such actions, the US decided to proudly, and - at least based on the AP article - publicly, declare it. As an example, the new White House guidelines would allow the military to transmit computer code to another country’s network to test the route and make sure connections work - much like using satellites to take pictures of a location to scout out missile sites or other military capabilities.
Ever since Stuxnet thundered on the global scene in the second half of 2010 the world has been awash with fresh doses of FUD. Slowly but surely calmer and more pragmatic heads are prevailing: Stuxnet: It’s a real threat, but not something we should shovel money at - By Tom Ricks | The Best Defense The correct response to Stuxnet is to acknowledge the risks of cyber war, but be discerning in our reaction. We must separate the sensational from the legitimate, and only invest in valid and practical strategies.
Fresh from the press comes ENISA’s final report & video clip on ‘Cyber Europe 2010’: the 1st pan- European cyber security exercise. The report underlines a need for: • more cyber security exercises in the future, • increased collaboration between the Member States, • the importance of the private sector in ensuring security. Largely the same findings as were found in Cyber Storm II (2008) and Cyber Storm III (2010). There is always a lot of talk about increased sharing of information, but the reality remains that in the current environment you cannot share information without having to sign a different non-disclosure agreement for different task forces and different special interest groups and different trusted information sharing committees and groups.
What we know about LiveJournal … - LiveJournal is extremely popular in Russia; - some of the opinions by Russian bloggers on LiveJournal aren’t to the liking of Putin’s “siloviki” (ex-KGB, now FSB people); - president Medvedev is an avid user of LiveJournal; and most importantly - whilst it seemed years ago that Medvedev is just a body keeping the presidential seat warm until Putin can return this doesn’t seem to be the case anymore. And that other news from Russia makes it clear that at least one side is positioning itself for information supremacy as part of overall supremacy.
There’s a good article quoting Martin Libicki of RAND Corp. and his talk at the CyberFutures symposium. Political leaders do not grasp the concepts of cyberspace and cyberwar at a level to confidently write policies, he said. “Cyberwar is a lot of magic. Try talking to high-level folks and figuring out what they actually understand about it. The best of them don’t have a clue and the worst of them think of things that have no basis in reality. So when something happens, it’s always a head-scratching event.